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 *  *  *  *  * 
 PROCEEDINGS 
 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Hello everybody.  Welcome to the afternoon 
session.  I am Susan Carle.  I teach legal ethics here at the 
Washington College of Law and am very pleased to be introducing 
our very distinguished panel for the symposium entitled, The Evolving 
Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
I understand that the morning panels, the second panel especially, 
explored some of the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley1 and the new SEC 
proposed regulations2 that have been issued under Section 307.3  So, 
we have decided as a panel to skip over some of that and to start to 
discuss from several perspectives what this is actually going to mean 
for lawyers who are representing corporate entities. 
Each of the panelists will speak for about ten minutes, raising their 
issues and concerns.  I am going to let the panelists define the scope 
of their topics as they take their turn to speak.  Then we hope to have 
plenty of time left over for interesting discussion and debate among 
different perspectives on these issues. 
What I will do now is introduce all of the panelists and then we will 
jump right into it. 
First of all, to my immediate right is Professor Jeffrey Bauman from 
Georgetown University Law Center.  His specialty is corporate law.  
He joined Georgetown University Law Center in 1973 and before that 
spent four years at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and five 
years in private practice.  He served on the Executive Council of the 
Securities Law Committee of the Federal Bar Association, on the 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”), and the Committee of Corporations, 
Partnerships and other Business Organizations of the D.C. Bar 
Association.  His writings include several law review articles 
concerning 10b-5,4 and he also is the co-author of a casebook on 
corporations. 
                                                          
      1 .    Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266). 
 2. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) 
(establishing standards of conduct for attorneys who represent issuers before the 
SEC). 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7245). 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002) (proscribing the use of manipulative and 
deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security). 
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PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Which I hope you will all use. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  In the best of the traditions of the bar, 
Professor Bauman also serves in a number of public interest and 
public service capacities, including on the Board of Directors of the 
Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless. 
To his immediate right is Arthur Burger, who is a Director at 
Jackson & Campbell, P.C. where he chairs the firm’s Professional 
Responsibility Practice Group and the firm’s Ethics Committee.  He is 
a member of the D.C. Bar Rules of Conduct Review Committee and 
frequently lectures and teaches on ethics issues for the D.C. Bar.  He 
is an adjunct faculty member at George Washington University Law 
School and co-teaches a course entitled, “Ethics in Adjudication and 
Settlement.”  Mr. Burger represents attorneys in law firms on matters 
related to professional responsibility. 
To his immediate right is Susan Hackett, who is the Senior Vice-
President and General Counsel for the American Corporate Counsel 
Association (“ACCA”).  She lectures regularly before a wide variety of 
legal audiences and is the author of numerous articles on 
professional and managerial topics. 
She serves on the Board of Directors of Equal Justice Works and 
was a former member of the Board of the Minority Corporate 
Counsel Association.  Her public service work includes serving as 
liaison to a number of ABA presidential commissions, on issues such 
as multi-jurisdictional practice, alternatives to the billable hour, and, 
on something many students in this room may be concerned with, 
loan repayment assistance programs.  She also serves on the ABA 
Center for Professional Responsibility. 
To her immediate right is Sheldon Krantz, who is a partner at the 
law firm of Piper Rudnick LLP.  His practice emphasizes preventative 
and litigation services in corporate and white collar criminal matters.  
His particular areas of focus include environmental law, healthcare, 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), exports, Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), legal ethics, and 
legal malpractice. 
He is a former Chair of the Criminal Justice Center of the ABA and 
has had extensive experience in white collar crime prevention and 
investigation.  He also, early in his career, was a prosecutor for the 
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice 
Department.  He was a law professor at Boston University School of 
Law—where I hear from my husband that he was an excellent 
professor—and then was Dean of the University of San Diego law 
school. 
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I have the privilege of serving with Mr. Krantz on the D.C. Legal 
Ethics Committee and can say that he is a very deft and diplomatic 
committee member who has negotiated us through a number of 
difficult ethics issues. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  I guess as the existing academic as 
compared to a former academic, I get to start. 
Actually it has been your privilege, such as it is, to have heard from 
a number of fugitives from the real world, of whom I am the last to 
speak today.  You have heard from Professor Karmel, Professor 
Painter, Professor Guttman, Judge Sporkin—although Judge Sporkin 
has retreated back to the real world.  Sheldon is now back in the real 
world also. 
This is a warm-up—this discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Another way 
of thinking about Sarbanes-Oxley is to think of it as the “Continuing 
Legal Education Relief Act of 2002.”  I can promise you that there 
will be a large number of Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) 
programs with people—large numbers of people paying huge 
amounts of money—to hear people like us who are very good at 
asking questions but end up with no answers. 
MS. HACKETT:  I’ll be taking all those registrations. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  There you go.  This is a Godsend.  I do 
not have to get business because I am only an academic, but the 
people out in the practicing bar do.  In case you think that I am 
jesting, I am old enough to remember when, in 1966-67, Judge 
McLean, Southern District of New York, decided the BarChris case.5  
One thousand lawyers paid a huge amount of money to find out how 
to avoid liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act.6  We all knew 
that we, the Wall Street bar, were not going to be nailed for any kind 
of wrongdoing.  It was “them”—those people who turned out 
opinions with mimeograph machines who were going to get nailed.  
Judge McLean instead said, “No, it’s the lawyers who are very much at 
fault for not doing sufficient due diligence.”7  
                                                          
 5. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(concluding that defendants’ gross overstatements of sales, profits, and customer 
orders; understatements of liabilities; and the failure to disclose officer loans, 
customer delinquencies, and application of proceeds constituted material matters on 
which the court could base liability). 
 6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (detailing the civil liabilities when a registrant 
omits a material fact from a securities registration statement or if the registration 
statement contains an untrue statement about a material fact). 
 7. See Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 692 (finding that an attorney of the law firm, which 
counseled BarChris Construction Corporation in matters concerning the registration 
of securities, “was obliged to make a reasonable investigation” but he failed to satisfy 
that obligation because “there [were] too many instances in which [he] failed to 
make an inquiry which he could easily have made . . . .”). 
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When Texas Gulf Sulphur8 was decided, a thousand people showed 
up at a Practicing Law Institute forum.  I have no doubt that 
Sarbanes-Oxley will generate just this kind of response. 
I want to start with my own background.  As Susan said, I spent four 
years at the SEC, five years in private practice at Arnold & Porter, and 
I have been teaching since what my children refer to as the “pre-Civil 
War days,” for thirty years. 
I also want to go back to some of what Chuck Davidow talked about 
in the first panel this morning.  I think all of us practicing corporate 
and securities law bring with us our own set of cultural biases and 
assumptions. 
I left the Commission in 1968.  I was a relatively young lawyer.  I 
had spent four years at a very exciting time in the Commission’s 
career, right after the legislation, the special study, it was very much a 
golden age.  It is not just that as I have gotten older that things look 
better than they ever really were.  It really was a great moment in the 
Commission’s history. 
I believed very firmly in the Commission’s mission to act in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors, the mantra that 
runs throughout the securities laws. 
When I went to Arnold & Porter, my mentor, the senior partner for 
whom I did most of my work, was Milt Freeman, who was also the 
author of Rule 10b-5 when he was at the Commission.  Milt told me 
early in my stay that it had taken him nearly two years before he 
stopped referring to the SEC as, “we.” I think that a number of us, 
and it is probably still true, who worked at the Commission are 
fiercely loyal to the Commission and very much buy into many of the 
values that the Commission has over the years stood for—the 
protection of the investors, whatever that may mean. 
It has not necessarily interfered with being a zealous advocate, but 
it certainly affects the way we have thought about the practice law.  It 
does not make us better or worse, but I think it does make us 
somewhat different from people who have never had the “inside the 
building” experience. 
I know that it is easy to focus on the gatekeeper role and either 
defend it or criticize it.  But I think it was implicit in what we did, and 
I think it is still true that, if you work on disclosure documents, as 
distinct from giving opinions as to whether securities need to be 
registered, if you work on disclosure documents you are very much 
                                                          
 8. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 842 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(determining that several individuals, including one of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s 
attorneys, participated in insider trading). 
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determining or advising on the materiality of disclosure.  You are 
saying, “Yes, this has to be disclosed; no, this doesn’t.” You do it from 
the perspective of having as full disclosure as possible.  
I have not read the Enron 10K, but when I listened to Chuck this 
morning describe it, I am prepared to believe it. There is Supreme 
Court law in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite9 that talks about materiality as 
not simply getting the information out there, but getting it in a 
readable, meaningful way.10  You can not put something on page 30, 
something else on page 50, and something else on page 199, and say, 
“I disclosed it all.” It has to be more than that.  I think that we as 
lawyers believe that, and, coming from the culture I came from, that 
was the way I acted. 
Putting this in Sarbanes-Oxley terms, I am struck by what it means 
for the lawyers out in the trenches.  I am not talking about, “Oh my 
God, I’ve discovered the greatest scandal in the world.  Do I go to the 
board of directors?” I do not think that is going to happen very often.  
I think that’s going to be the very rare case.  Rather, I think Sarbanes-
Oxley is important, much as BarChris11 and Texas Gulf12 and some 
other cases—Student Marketing,13 that was another 1000 person CLE 
program—are important as wake-up calls, as reminders to the bar 
that we have to take what we are doing seriously. 
I am struck by how difficult the questions are and how very much 
Sarbanes-Oxley leaves open—and I’ll be interested in what you all 
have to say—what seem to me very much the kind of warp and woof 
of daily practice. 
As a young lawyer working on a registration statement, I would—
well, take an insurance company.  I would spend several days 
immersed in the State Insurance Commission reports, and I would 
learn about the life insurance business, whatever it was.  I would go 
and I would spend time, however much time I needed, with top 
company officials getting all the data I needed to draft the 
registration.  I would ask questions, and they would explain.  I would 
say, “You know, I think we have to disclose that.”  The president, the 
                                                          
 9. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 10. See id. at 385 (stating that courts tend to find materiality when the 
shareholder demonstrates that the proxy solicitation, rather than a 
misrepresentation in the solicitation materials, is responsible for the corporation 
obtaining the votes required to authorize an action). 
 11. Escott, 283 F. Supp. at 643. 
 12. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833. 
 13. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 
352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (concluding that buyers of newly issued securities had an 
implied right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
against the securities issuer and its accounting firm, as well as outside counsel). 
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CEO, would put his arm around me, and he would say, “Jeff, you’re 
really a very smart, young lawyer.” Emphasis on the young.  And he 
says, “Frankly I’ve been in this business for thirty years, you don’t 
understand.  You really don’t.  It isn’t material.  If you knew it better, 
you would see that.  We’ve thought about that.” 
 He was right, I did not understand.  Unless I had been doing 
insurance law all of my life, I might never have understood.  But if 
you go from insurance, to cattle feeding, to oil and gas, you do not 
understand anything.  You understand just enough to get the 
registration statement done, and you move on. 
If I had been a young lawyer and I really was suspicious or 
concerned—because I had been talked out of the disclosure, because 
I had been told by someone that I don’t understand, by someone 
who clearly does—am I now obligated to go up the ladder, starting 
with the senior partner in my firm, and then the partner has to make 
the decision to go to the general counsel of the client, and so on? 
If I don’t do that, am I now subject to—.  Am I now subject to 
liability under 307?14  Am I 307’ed or 102(e)’ed or whatever the 
phrase is going to turn out to be?  I don’t know what the answer to 
that is. 
There are a lot more questions than there are answers.  I think all 
of us sitting here could talk at great length about all of the issues that 
were talked about in the first two panels, whether it is the desirability 
of federalization, federalizing the state ethics, making it mandatory, 
or you name it.  We could all talk about it. 
I asked the question in the first session, “if Sarbanes-Oxley, section 
307 had been on the books, would Enron have come out any 
differently?”  Without knowing what Vinson & Elkins knew, or said, or 
was asked to do, my instinct is no.  It would not have changed 
anything at all. 
I think the virtue of Sarbanes-Oxley, as has been the case from time 
to time, is to ask the question, “Where were the lawyers?”  It serves a 
useful function.  Whether it ought to go as far as it goes or how far it 
will go, I leave to my fellow panelists. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Thank you. 
MR. BURGER:  Thanks, Professor, for leaving it up to us. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  I think we will just go right down the line. 
MR. BURGER: Good afternoon.  I come at this having a sort of 
natural sympathy for the lawyer who is on the ground as the Professor 
                                                          
 14. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
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said, having represented lawyers, and being one, and having faced 
many dilemmas.  I am pretty comfortable with the traditional 
paradigm that the lawyer has full loyalty and confidence to the client, 
and that in return for that, the client freely has a flow of information 
to the lawyer.  It is kind of a cozy relationship, and it works because 
the involvement of the lawyer will tend to improve the ultimate 
product. 
That is the notion of the attorney-client privilege.15  It is that the 
free flow of information is considered beneficial.  Yes, the person who 
holds the privilege would have some pretty good tales to tell as would 
a priest or a doctor or anybody else who has a privilege.  But there is 
an ultimate benefit to it. 
 So, I am brought a bit kicking and screaming into this notion that 
the SEC has promulgated, but I am a little bit more optimistic that 
this may make sense.  I have as a sort of an axiom, in order to keep 
my sanity, the mantra that I always have in addressing an ethical 
dilemma—there always has to be some place on the cat walk that you 
are allowed to place your foot.  There has got to be someplace.  
Because the alternative is, obviously, a big fall. 
There always has to be some right answer for a lawyer.  For me, and 
this is as a member of the D.C. Bar Rules of Professional Conduct 
Review Committee where the rules get revised, is, whatever rule there 
should be for a lawyer, at least make it clear.  At least point to where 
that spot is on the catwalk and then I know where to place my foot.  
Of course, that whole notion of there being a place on the catwalk 
gets awfully narrow when we are talking about a situation in which 
the lawyer as advocate instantly has to become watchdog based upon 
some ephemeral series of events. 
The statute was quite brief in terms of what these rules ought to 
encompass.16  They really took these and filled in an awful lot of 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose 
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
administration of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or 
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”). 
 16. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 116 Stat. at 749-50 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7245) (stating that an attorney must “report evidence of a material breach of 
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any 
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the 
company” and “if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the 
evidence . . . requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of 
the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of the board of directors 
comprised solely of directors not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to 
the board of directors”). 
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questions.  I think there are some answers to the questions, and there 
are very specific circumstances which mandate an outside lawyer to 
withdraw17 and circumstances with an in-house counsel as not having 
to resign for instance.18  But the length that you can fall from this 
catwalk has really gotten pretty steep.  I do not know if anybody in the 
earlier panels that Section 205.619 says that a violation by the lawyer of 
this section is subject to the same penalties and remedies as a 
violation of the Act.20  So, that is a big difference for lawyers who have, 
up to this point, assumed that there was some degree of immunity for 
aiding and abetting situations. 
The reason why I say it may make sense is two things.  One, an SEC 
practice, more than other types of attorney representation, does 
involve a very high degree of the attorney actually participating in the 
product.  The lawyer is right in there, in the trench with the client, 
inherently in an SEC-type practice.  Two, I have to say that the SEC 
staff obviously put a great deal of work and a great deal of thought 
into pretty specific rules.  To me, one of the most interesting 
provisions here is that it gives—this is very interesting in terms of the 
dynamic between lawyer and client.  A client can fire a lawyer at any 
time for any reason or for no reason.21  That will never change.  The 
client can fire the lawyer.  But, the lawyer is permitted, if the lawyer 
thinks that they were fired for complying with these provisions, to 
take that fact to the Commission.22  That is a real power shift.  The 
                                                          
 17. See Implementation of the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71689 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
205) (requiring the “noisy withdrawal” of an outside attorney who believes that a 
material violation is occurring or is going to occur and who finds the issuer’s 
response inappropriate, after reporting the breach to the issuer). 
 18. See id. at 71674  (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3) (requiring an issuer’s in-
house attorney who believes that a material violation is ongoing or is about to occur 
and will cause substantial injury, to disaffirm any work product associated with the 
violation but is not required to withdraw). 
 19. See id. at 71696 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (stating that an attorney 
practicing before the SEC, while representing an issuer, is subject to the same 
penalties of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-u (2000) (“The Commission 
may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, to any person the 
privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission in any way, if that person 
is found by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing in the matter-- 
(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; (2) to be lacking in 
character or integrity, or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional 
conduct; or (3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation 
of, any provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations issued 
thereunder”). 
 21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(3) (2002) (stating a lawyer 
shall not represent a client when the lawyer is discharged); id. R. 1.16 cmt. 4 
(explaining that a client has the right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or 
without cause). 
 22. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
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lawyer is in a position, a dangerous position, to fight back in a pretty 
big way. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  There is a material omission in the 
statement. 
MR. BURGER:  It is a material—and, of course, the real crux of the 
issue will be that the lawyer will need to make the call, is there a 
material violation?  If yes, there is a place on the catwalk.  But, if the 
lawyer says, “No, there is not a material violation,” then there is a long 
way to fall.  If the lawyer says, “Yes, there is a material violation,” there 
is also a long way to fall, but there is still a place on the catwalk. 
MS. HACKETT:  I am going to address the, “who is the client 
issue,” since that is an issue that is very near and dear to my 
membership at the American Corporate Counsel Association. 
Before I do, I wanted to first of all make my caveat that we are still 
formulating our opinion at ACCA.  We plan to be filing comments on 
this issue with the Commission, so what I am talking about today may 
or may not end up actually representing the opinion of the 
association on this.  We’re still working on it.  
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  It may not even be your opinion. 
MS. HACKETT:  Exactly.  The other thing that I would note before 
I begin these comments is that, especially in listening to the 
discussion today and in thinking about this issue for the last several 
weeks and even months, I have gone back to look at the fundamental 
purpose of lawyer regulation and professional responsibility.  I think 
it is important as we hold these dialogues and have these discussions 
to recognize that there is a difference between professional 
responsibility and lawyer regulation.  There are some professional 
rules in the code that are about professional responsibility: 1.1—
competence;23 1.6—attorney-client privilege;24 1.7—conflict of interest 
questions.25  But when it comes right down to it, the vast bulk of the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility is not really about 
professional responsibility, it is about lawyer regulation of the bar by 
ourselves.26   
                                                          
Fed. Reg. at 71706 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (proposing that an attorney 
who reasonably believes that a corporate client fired him for reporting a material 
violation, may notify the SEC of this belief). 
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (stating that a lawyer must provide 
competent representation). 
 24. Id. R. 1.6 (stating the general rule that a lawyer shall not reveal any 
information relating to the representation of a client). 
 25. Id. R. 1.7 (stating that a lawyer may not represent a client if that 
representation would be in conflict with the representation of another client except 
in a few explicitly stated circumstances). 
 26. See, e.g., id. R. 8.3 (stating that lawyers have a duty to regulate other lawyers). 
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I think that it is important as we look at these questions to keep in 
mind, what is professional responsibility and what is lawyer 
regulation?  Or put another way, within my membership, what is 
about the lawyers and what is about the clients? 
Within the American Corporate Council Association, this is a very 
regular debate.  We constantly remind ourselves as we are working on 
issues like this that we need to remember that this is not about novel 
contemplation for lawyers and their self-regulatory needs.  This is also 
about the representation of clients and what they expect, demand, 
and have a right to expect from their lawyers.  
I think the other thing I would note before we begin is something 
that came up a little bit earlier.  There is an assumption out here that 
these rules are really applying to people who are within the corporate 
structure or in law firms representing clients and working on 
securities matters.  I think that we do not know yet how far these rules 
will go, but I would be willing to bet you dollars to donuts that what is 
going to happen is that a lot more lawyers are going to be subject to 
these rules than you may be believing if you are thinking this is really 
about people who are working on 10Ks. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  I agree with that.  If you are an anti-trust 
lawyer, there are securities implications to the anti-trust work you are 
doing even if you are not working on the disclosure documents. 
MS. HACKETT:  Remember, these are going to go beyond 
securities laws.  The SEC is mandating an “up the ladder” reporting 
obligation if an attorney reasonably believes that a material violation 
of securities law or breach of fiduciary or similar violation has 
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.  Now that is a heck of a 
lot more than securities law for which the SEC is going to be 
requiring mandatory reporting.  Breach of fiduciary duty could be 
about environmental law.  I think you should keep in mind that this is 
not just about securities law or people who work on securities law.  
This is potentially far more reaching than that. 
Having said that, I had wanted to talk a little bit about who is the 
client in order to bring to you some of the practical perspectives that 
I think we are hearing from our members and that we have been 
polling and doing some survey work on, so that you might hear what 
some of the buzz on the street actually is within the corporate 
community, the corporate legal community, on this issue. 
First of all, everyone that we are talking to—when I am talking 
about this, I am generally talking about general counsel.  I know that 
there are many other people involved in the legal business of in-
house counseling beyond the general counsel.  But, for all intents 
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and purposes, since the general counsel is the person who sets the 
tone within the organization’s legal department and since it is that 
person who will determine the “up the ladder” crawl, I am generally 
focusing on what our general counsel are saying.  
What’s the buzz on the street?  Everyone admits that we need to do 
something post-Enron to restore public trust in corporations and, 
more particularly, public trust in corporate financial results.  The 
problem lies in understanding what solutions will actually address the 
concerns that Enron raises about the role of lawyers.  In truth, it 
appears that the vast majority of post-Enron proposals are really 
designed to give more comfort to the public, but will do little 
practically to impact clients and may have a perversely deleterious 
effect on the likelihood that lawyers will be able to prevent such 
debacles in the future. 
This is a common refrain that we are hearing right now within the 
corporate community.  It is not that they are not willing to embrace 
reforms or that they do not believe that reforms are needed.  But 
working around the Rules of Professional Responsibility or going 
through this kind of rulemaking process at the SEC is missing the 
point.  It is not going to create an environment where Enrons will be 
prevented in the future. 
If you talk to most sophisticated in-house general counsel, they will 
tell you that the SEC proposals, as they understand them at this stage, 
are not really very threatening in a practical manner.  Many of them 
already live in highly regulated worlds and the concept of reporting 
up the ladder and even reporting up and out of the corporation are 
well-established and will not change the way they work with their 
management or staff. 
The concerns that we are raising at ACCA tend to be concerns that 
we have as a bar association and on behalf of our members because 
we are involved in longer term questions about what is happening 
with the rules and where that will lead us in ten years than our 
members may be focused on right now. 
Most folks within the in-house community that we are talking to do 
not feel overly threatened by what is being proposed because they do 
not think it is going to affect them.  Indeed, most general counsel at 
larger companies are taking their cue from their management and 
are seeking to embrace changes in an effort to re-instill confidence in 
corporate America and live up to higher standards of responsible 
corporate citizenship. 
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That does not mean that they are thrilled by Sarbanes-Oxley or the 
SEC’s proposed regulations.27  But, because Enron-like debacles are 
not widespread problems, in spite of the amount of coverage they 
receive and the size of these recent failures, I think that most assume 
that it is unlikely that they will ever have to grapple with a situation 
that would give rise to the reporting requirements of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. 
In a practical world, I do not know of a single general counsel who 
honestly believes that they would report up the ladder of their 
management, and even beyond their management to the board, and 
that any board in the Western world at this point would say to them, 
“We choose not to take your advice, we’d rather have an SEC 
investigation triggered.” It’s just never going to happen.  So, while 
ACCA as an organization is likely to protest the diminution of the 
attorney-client privilege presented by the rules in their reporting out 
requirements, we are certainly not hearing our members telling us 
that this is a huge issue that they believe is really going to impact the 
way they practice.  It will only happen in the organization where the 
general counsel is absent and has not really focused on this issue or 
where you are perhaps in a small organization that is very closely held 
and that does not really understand the realities of the environment. 
What is wrong with these proposed rules then from the perspective 
of the bar?  Even if you do not ever plan to report under the rules, 
there are a few issues that we believe in-house counsel are concerned 
about and that certainly as an organization we are taking a stand on.  
These are the issues that concern the bar because they make policy 
changes that go beyond, way beyond, the desire to change the 
practice of lawyers working in a few errant companies, and indeed 
change the design of our ethics rules. 
John Villa, who we work with quite regularly and who practices at 
Williams & Connolly, puts it in a very succinct manner.  He says that 
what these rules do is threaten to change us from focusing on 
prohibiting lawyers from getting involved in or facilitating client 
misconduct to creating rules that focus on making lawyers prohibit 
clients from committing misconduct.  There is a significant 
difference.  The model rules, traditionally, have been about making 
sure lawyers do not do illegal things.28  Instead, these are changes that 
would make model rules for lawyers to make them responsible for 
prohibiting their clients from engaging in illegal conduct—a 
                                                          
 27. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 71670, 71670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 28. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. 
PANEL 3.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:05 PM 
668 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:655 
policeman’s role. 
These proposals, therefore, offer a rather novel approach to the 
age-old in-house question of, who is the client?  By making a lawyer a 
policeman, in order to get to that role, you have to do some pretty 
careful acrobatics.  The technical answer to the question of who is the 
client is the entity.  Most in-house counsel know that the practical 
reality is that the entity only works on a day-to-day basis through the 
flesh and blood actions of management and the board.  They treat 
the management of the company as the day-to-day client as long as 
the management stays within the law.  If the management acts 
inappropriately and will not change course, the lawyer reminds the 
managers in question that the client is actually the company and they 
start the climb up the 1.1329 ladder of authority seeking redress. 
If management is intransigent, the lawyer goes over their head to 
the board.  If the board does not take responsible action, then the in-
house lawyer has to consult the rules in his or her state to understand 
what the options and mandates are.  We talked a little bit earlier 
about the 1.6 issues that are currently in play between the ABA, which 
has a model rule in conflict with what forty-one states have as their 
model rule for 1.6,30 or for their rule 1.16.31 
The SEC’s regulations, however, say that the entity’s best interests 
require the lawyer to report to the SEC, because management and 
the board cannot represent the client’s interest if they are acting 
illegally.32 
That argument may be intellectually appealing, but it suffers from 
a few pesky faults.  First, if the board and the management are no 
longer a valid representative of the client, who exactly is the lawyer 
                                                          
 29. See id. R. 1.13(b)(3) (stating that if a lawyer knows that a person associated 
with the client organization has or is likely to violate a law, which will likely result in a 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer has a duty to refer the matter 
to a higher authority, including the highest authority in the organization). 
 30. Compare id. R. 1.6 (stating a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, but permitting 
lawyers to reveal confidential information to protect the public’s safety or to establish 
a defense in a suit against the lawyer), with e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6 (2002) (stating that it is mandatory for a lawyer to reveal confidential information 
if the lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent his or her client from 
committing a crime that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or bodily 
harm). 
 31. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (detailing a lawyer’s duty 
concerning declining or terminating representation of a client), with e.g., D.C. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002) (stating that a lawyer may withdraw 
from representation in certain situations, but not including the situation in which 
the lawyer believes that the client’s objective is repugnant or imprudent). 
 32. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 71690-91 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3) (stating that reporting the 
alleged material violation to the SEC is for the purpose of protecting the issuer’s 
interest). 
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reporting to and representing?  That is actually a pretty difficult 
question to answer if you are the lawyer who is sitting in the shoes of 
the person who has now gone up the ladder and found an 
unresponsive management and an unresponsive board. 
It certainly is not the SEC that you are representing, even though 
these rules of conduct create a very difficult conflict of interest for 
most lawyers who are now charged with either reporting to the SEC 
or continuing to maintain what they had traditionally thought were 
their client’s interests.  In an era when stockholders can number in 
the millions, is it reasonable to assume that the stockholders are the 
client so that the lawyer has the representation interest in the 
stockholders interest and should seek to avoid any action which 
might cause the company’s stock to tumble?  If the stockholder is the 
client and the management and the board are no longer the client, 
what will we be asking lawyers technically to do, protect the stock 
price?  That is certainly a perverse answer that we do not want lawyers 
to be involved in.  That is not at all what the goal of any of this 
legislation was supposed to be.  
It seems indeed that the only answer is that the client ends up 
being the public interest.  Now we have a situation, if you work this to 
its logical conclusion where we have really put the legal profession 
and our assumptions of what the attorney-client privilege and 
professional responsibility to the client are, we now have lawyers who 
do not represent the clients that they are retained by, but who 
represent the public.  That is the definition of a prosecutor or a 
policeman—not the definition of a corporate lawyer. 
I think that is where we are starting to run into some of the 
difficulties in figuring out how it is—the “who is the client” question.  
The way the SEC has answered it is going to play out in the corporate 
role. 
By deputizing lawyers who are employed or retained by corporate 
clients to act as remedial policemen, what we are doing is 
diminishing the client’s trust in the lawyer and his role.  Rather, we 
should be looking for ways to increase the influence of lawyers as 
compliance counselors who specialize in preventive loss skills.  
Instead of deputizing in-house counsel as legal police to wipe out 
crime where it exists, the SEC’s proposals could have the perverse 
effect of marginalizing the role of lawyers who could prevent crimes 
from arising.   
What would likely happen is that, in order to practice preventive 
law, you have to be a welcome and respected participant in creating 
the corporate culture.  You must be invited to meetings.  You need to 
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be rewarded for your leadership with positions on strategic teams 
where company policies and decisions are being made.  There is no 
way a lawyer can force herself into client activities where she is not 
welcomed or she is not trusted and expect to hear anything 
important.  How much less effective and included will those counsel 
playing the potential role of deputy on-the-spot for the SEC be in 
performing their functions preventatively? 
It is important to note that in this context “trusted” is not 
synonymous with “complicit.”  Trusted in-house counsel are advisors 
who have the confidence and respect of their management, which 
includes standing up to management where actions under discussion 
do not measure up. 
Indeed, our surveys of CEOs that ask what roles they wish their in-
house counsel to play tell us that there was only one role that was 
more important to the CEO for the in-house counsel to play than 
that of ethics advisor and that was as legal educator.33  The roles that 
lost out on those surveys were roles that included acting as a personal 
consultant to the CEO or representing other members of 
management on specific issues.34  Clients want their in-house lawyers 
to prevent legal problems from arising.  That is why they hire them to 
be full-time employees, rather than retaining them as outside counsel 
only after a legal mess hits the fan. 
When I came to work at ACCA, I learned what it is that makes the 
thousands of in-house counsel unique from their outside 
counterparts.  It is their primary interest in keeping the client’s milk 
in the glass and not cleaning it up or reporting it after it has been 
spilled.  Preventive loss practices are premised on the confidence of 
the client in the lawyer as an effective and trusted part of the 
corporate team.  Post-Enron, this kind of preventive focus and service 
will be twice as desirable for the public and far more desirable than 
the too late service of a lawyer who reports wrongdoing already done. 
ACCA’s attention is going to be focused on creating and 
disseminating compliance-based resources for corporate lawyers to 
help them target the needs and preventive concerns of their clients.  
We are developing a full line of CLE initiatives,35 and also a variety of 
                                                          
 33. See Special Report: The View from the Top: CEOs Give Their In-house Counsel an 
“Excellent” Report Card, ACCA DOCKET, May 2001 (listing the top eleven roles of in-
house counsel given by corporate Chief Executive Officers), http://www.acca.com/ 
Surveys/CEO/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n Website, CLE Online-Long Distance Learning 
(listing a plethora of online programs aimed at aiding and assisting in-house 
counsel), at http://www.acca.com/education/cle.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
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collected best practices, Website resources, and what we call “bully 
pulpit” and mentoring outreach that will help lawyers help clients 
prevent future Enrons. 
We think it is misguided to focus so much attention on changing 
the Model Rules of lawyer conduct when we could be offering the 
means to achieve realistic and workable solutions that foreclose 
ethical lapses in modern corporate cultures.  When we comment to 
the SEC on these issues, we plan to remind the SEC that they are 
making some very important choices when they publish these rules.  
We believe it is unwise to change the rules of legal ethics without an 
established connection between those changes and the 
corresponding behaviors that are of concern.  Absent such evidence 
of a corresponding behavior change, we believe it is far wiser to 
spend our time focused on how to prevent future Enrons from 
arising. 
Lawyers are and should remain vital parts of the corporate team 
who can function to prevent corporate criminal activity by virtue of 
their role as trusted advisors.  No one calls a policeman until after the 
crime is committed. 
MR. KRANTZ:  My role here today is going to be a little bit 
different.  I am a white collar criminal defense lawyer, and I will say at 
the outset that I am an extremist on the sanctity of the attorney-client 
privilege.  Let me tell you why by using an example, a personal 
example. 
Let’s say hypothetically that Dean Andy Pike is under criminal 
investigation for a Ponzi scheme.  He comes to my office.  My view as 
a criminal defense lawyer is that I need a client to tell me everything 
that he can about his situation so I can figure out how to best 
represent him.  If I tell my client, Dean Pike, “Listen you can confide 
in me, tell me everything so I can represent you effectively,” and he 
does, and then I also serve as a surrogate of the government to turn 
over miscreants, you can see the impact that would have on Dean 
Pike. 
But the other illustration is, let’s say I’m more forthcoming as a 
lawyer, and I say to my client, “Listen, I want you to tell me everything 
there is that I need to know to represent you, but on the other hand I 
may confide in the government in terms of what you tell me.” What is 
he going to do? 
Now it seems to me—and I will get to the point of how this plays 
out in a corporate context—it frames the issue of why the attorney-
client privilege is so important.  I would say at the outset that I agree 
with other members of the panel—if you take a look at Sarbanes-
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Oxley or the proposed SEC rules,36 for the most part, they do not 
raise the fear that some of us who really care about the attorney-client 
privilege would have up to this point.  But I want to look down the 
road a few years.  Corporations are not the favorites of either 
members of Congress or even the American public.  It is easy to hate 
corporations and, by the way, it is easy to hate lawyers. 
On that basis, and we have certainly seen evidence of this in the 
area of street crime over the period of the 1990s, once Congress gets 
going, they will keep going.  You can begin to anticipate what 
additional requirements may be imposed upon lawyers and on 
corporations just as a political matter.  So, I am less concerned about 
today.  I am very concerned about where we are going to be going 
tomorrow. 
I want to give you one illustration of what is going on right now 
that is a precursor, in my view, of the problem.  There is something 
called the “Holder Memorandum.”37  Eric Holder was the former 
Deputy Attorney General of the United States.  During the Clinton 
Administration, the Department of Justice issued the Holder 
Memorandum, which provided guidelines to federal prosecutors on 
situations when you prosecute companies or when you do not.38  This 
is a very important set of guidelines for federal prosecutors. 
There is a provision in the Holder Memorandum that says the 
following: when someone comes in on behalf of a company and 
attempts to convince you that you should not prosecute the company, 
or comes in to talk to you in plea negotiations, it may be appropriate 
for you to require waiver of attorney-client privilege as a condition of 
having those discussions.39 
I want to tell you from personal experience, including an 
experience that has been going on the last four months and even was 
existing this morning before I came here, that I am in the midst of 
talking to a U.S. Attorney’s office to try to convince that office that 
my client is not guilty of any crime and they ought to decline 
prosecution.  The government’s response to me has been that the 
way you do so is you waive attorney-client privilege and you give us 
                                                          
 36. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 71670 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 37. See Memorandum from The Deputy Attorney General, to All Component 
Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (discussing the issue of bringing 
criminal charges against corporations), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
policy/chargingcorps.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003). 
 38. See id. (delineating twelve principles to be referenced when determining 
whether to prosecute corporations). 
 39. See id. (“[T]he prosecutor may request that the corporation waive the 
attorney-client and work product privileges”). 
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every document, the results of your internal corporate investigation.  
Then we will decide whether or not it is appropriate either to decline 
prosecution or to come up with a minor sentence that will not, in 
effect, bankrupt your company.40 
This is not kind of an isolated situation.  As I talk to members of 
the white collar criminal defense bar around the country, there is a 
common theme in U.S. Attorney’s offices that we need to get waivers 
of attorney-client privilege because these lawyers are hiding 
something, the companies are hiding something, and frankly, it is a 
very easy way to investigate a crime.41 
Let me just tell you very quickly what the implications are of this 
besides the impact on the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege.  It 
really picks up on something Susan said, which is, if the role of 
responsible companies today is to try to get to the bottom of 
problems when they hear allegations, either through a hotline or 
through a subpoena, that there is a problem—a responsible company 
wants to get to the bottom of it.  When they retain outside counsel, 
the direction to outside counsel is, get to the bottom of it, so we can 
make informed decisions about what we have to do internally, 
whether we have to provide information to the government. 
The impact of requiring waivers of attorney-client privilege or 
extending out the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley or SEC rules will 
be this, very simply.  Again, if I go into a company saying, “I’ve been 
retained to engage in this internal investigation, and by the way, I 
either tell you or you find out from some other source, that what you 
provide to me in the form of documents and statements will be 
turned over or potentially could be turned over because the 
government is going to require it,” the impact of that is that witnesses 
inside a company are not going to level with us when we are doing 
our internal investigation.  People stop taking notes.  They don’t 
write things down.  They destroy documents, which makes it 
impossible for a company to demand accountability from its 
personnel and ultimately makes it difficult for companies to engage 
in self-policing. 
Because at the end of the day, if corporations are going to behave, 
it is largely because of responsible management and lawyers who give 
them the kind of advice other people on the panel were talking 
about.  If we are denied access to the truth because of rules that are 
developed by the government, which in effect discourage honesty in 
                                                          
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.  Note that the Holder memo was widely distributed to “All Component 
Heads and United States Attorneys.” Id. 
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the process of investigation, we are in serious difficulty. 
As I said, I am less worried about today.  I am very worried about 
where we are going and its impact.  I would say, as a final matter, I 
can understand the attitude that lawyers who participate in criminal 
conduct in effect and then get to hide behind the shield of the 
attorney-client privilege is a troublesome factor.  I think that in 
whatever system you devise there are going to be lawyers who 
misbehave. 
But I want to tell you also that the federal government, in my 
experience is not afraid to prosecute lawyers who engage in 
misconduct and for the most part, there will be ways to deal with 
those problems.  With that in mind, I think, Ms. Chair, we can open 
the thing up for questions. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Thank you all very much.  I think that was a 
wonderful introduction to the many issues we can talk about.  As I 
suspected, I think that there is a lot of similarity, especially as we got 
closer to the end of the table here, of situated perspectives of people 
who represent either in-house or act as outside counsel to corporate 
entities. 
I want to sort of get things started by playing devil’s advocate in a 
way—thinking about it from the other side.  My situated practice 
perspective before becoming a law professor was as a plaintiff’s lawyer 
and a union side labor lawyer.  I have been on the other side of this 
question about attorney-client privilege and what kinds of facts can be 
withheld in an investigation situation by cloaking them in attorney-
client privilege or by bringing in counsel to investigate wrong-doing. 
My question is, what do you all think about the possibility that 
there is something seriously wrong with the legal culture surrounding 
legal compliance counseling by corporate lawyers in the sense that—
and I have certainly seen this with management-side labor lawyers—
instead of counseling compliance with the spirit of federal regulation, 
the culture has become one where the counseling is to go as far as 
you can to the line?  To disclose as little as possible, to find a way to 
massage the situation or massage the facts in a very aggressive kind of 
anti-regulation perspective. 
The SEC is feeling frustration about this.  Because there is not a 
culture of compliance, they feel that they need to figure out some 
way to mandate the culture of compliance, and its best targets are the 
lawyers who, of everybody representing the organization, should be 
the ones who are most concerned about preserving the spirit of the 
statute. 
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I think this goes back to Professor Bauman’s earlier discussions 
about a culture that existed, at least among lawyers who had formerly 
worked for the SEC, of really caring about preserving the spirit and 
the intent of the statutory structure.  Is that gone?  Is that really what 
the problem is here?  I will just open it up for everybody. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  I guess I wonder, particularly listening to 
Sheldon, whether your question lumps together litigation and 
transactional work.  I understand that ultimately transactional work 
can wind up in litigation.  As my first boss, Manny Cohen, who was 
then the Chairman of the SEC, used to begin his talks by saying, “Yes, 
securities laws are criminal statutes,” and indeed they are.  A willful 
violation is that.  But, for the most part, clients do not come to 
transactional lawyers doing the deal the way they come to Sheldon. 
Susan, when you talk about compliance, I wonder whether your 
question looks more to transactional compliance.  In what context 
are you asking the question? 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  I think that is a very good point.  One of the 
problems is that we have the same set of rules that apply to “after the 
milk is spilled” representation, representation post wrongdoing.  We 
apply the same rules to those lawyers as we do to the lawyers who are 
supposed to be keeping the milk from coming out of the glass in the 
first place. 
Maybe what the SEC is saying here is, to the extent that you are 
situated as a lawyer to prevent the problem, you need to be a lot more 
aggressive than you seem as a matter of your professional culture to 
feel you need to be at this point. 
MS. HACKETT:  I think that it is actually even broader than that.  I 
mean you have gone from terms of litigation versus litigation and 
transactional work.  I would take it even further.  I think the bulk of 
what I see in-house counsel doing these days does not even fall into 
either one of those categories.  It falls into something that us more 
broadly termed “counseling.”  It may not be around any specific deal.  
It may not be around any specific matter.  It may not be in response 
to milk that has spilled.  It may be the day-to-day workings that have 
functional strategic teams working on the development of products, 
working on the provision of services, working on the administration 
of the corporation’s assets, the personnel and everything else. 
Lawyers are involved in an in-house basis as managers in the same 
regard, or in the same way, that other corporate managers are 
involved.  They have a business function to perform.  The in-house 
counsel, if they are doing their role well in the modern corporation, 
does not wait for the client to request advice.  That person is in the 
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trench every day developing the product and service, and they wear a 
business hat almost as often as they wear a legal hat. Another ethical 
problem is the issue of when are you doing business versus when are 
you acting as a lawyer?  One that we have a lot of $1000 seminars on if 
you are ever interested in attending.  But all that aside— 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  You are into teaching. 
MS. HACKETT:  It is a pattern here, isn’t it?  I think it is important 
to note that the role of counseling has dramatically changed, and I 
think you have hit it right on the head, Susan, by noting that the 
same rules are created to try to regulate all of that behavior.  They 
were written in the context of assuming a litigation, state court based, 
not federally legal mandate.  They were written in an era when 
lawyers waited until clients came to them to request advice. 
I think that we, at least within our organization, have come to the 
informal conclusion that one of the things we have to work on is 
proposing new Model Rules for the attorney-client privilege.  I think 
there have been gross abuses of how the attorney-client privilege has 
been used inappropriately in recent years, at least in the ways we 
believe that lawyers are supposed to function in today’s organizations. 
Having said that, I still believe that it is the linchpin or the 
foundation of the lawyer-client relationship and should not be 
diminished.  It is just necessary for us sit down and have a very 
informed dialogue, away from the heat of this kind of post-Enron 
corporate financial debacle, to talk about what the attorney-client 
privilege should be and how it should be used in today’s 
environment—decide how it should be regulated in a way that is not 
in response in Sarbanes-Oxley. 
MR. KRANTZ:  Susan, if I could just add one comment.  From my 
experience, even though I am primarily focused on litigation, we do a 
lot of preventive compliance work too that we have brought into 
companies to try to steer them through things. 
I think the tensions over the last ten years that have created some 
of the problems are:  one, there is no doubt there has been corporate 
greed over a good number of years and the question is how do you 
control people who want to make as much money as they can because 
this is America?  Versus another stress, that is, in effect, we are over-
regulated in many ways in this country.  We have complex regulations 
for every aspect of business life, whether it is environmental 
regulations, or healthcare regulations, or government contract 
regulations, where even very sophisticated counsel and companies 
cannot understand what the rules are.  Violations of those rules used 
to be dealt with as civil matters.  They have now become criminal 
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matters with virtually strict liability connotations. 
It is within that spirit that we begin to address some of these 
problems.  I think to a certain extent there are companies or people 
in companies up to no good.  In other situations, there are people 
that simply do not understand the rules, and they are trying to get 
guidance.  I think you really have to think about issues with that in 
mind. 
MS. HACKETT:  Let’s start first with the fact that most lawyers do 
not understand the rules of their own profession.  We are beyond 
talking about regulation.  Since this is a law school program, let’s 
begin at the law school level. 
My members consider themselves to be very ethical people and 
people who are very proud of their commitment to professional 
responsibility in the way that they represent their clients.  I know 
from my work that most of them are not intimately familiar with the 
Model Rules or the rules in their states or the rules in the many states 
in which they are practicing where they are not even admitted. 
I think it is an increasing problem that we look at addressing these 
kinds of issues through changes of the regulations which lawyers 
themselves admit that they do not pay attention to anyway.  It seems 
almost that, if you want to be sure that there will be no change in the 
way that lawyers behave, the best way to do it might be to change the 
rules of professional behavior since most lawyers learn what they 
know about ethics in a practical manner, not by reading the rules 
every day.  Most of them do not have a copy of the rules, do not know 
where they could find a copy of the rules, and they learn what they 
learn at the hands of the people who trained them. 
That starts in law school and it goes on through your journeyman 
type experiences whether it is in a government position, in a law firm, 
or working in a clerkship.  Some people get great ethical training, 
some people get seat of the pants ethical training, and some people 
never think twice about it.  But very few of them from any of those 
categories have any knowledge of what the rules actually say. 
That was pointed to earlier by the person who talked about how 
1.13 is not seen as the mode of reporting within most organizations, 
because most lawyers who work with organizational clients do not 
know what 1.13 says.  They are not bad people.  They do not consider 
themselves unethical. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Could I follow-up on that? 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Yes, sure. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  I guess I am interested in listening to 
what the two of you just said.  At the extent to which decisions like 
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Delaware’s Chancellor Allen’s decision in Caremark42 or the federal 
sentencing guidelines43 have set up the kinds of cultures that lean 
more toward up the ladder reporting, setting up procedures within a 
company for legal compliance systems and reporting.  In  a sense they 
do not blunt section 307, or the SEC’s rules, but they make the SEC’s 
rules not the only story that is going on.  To what extent does what 
the SEC’s doing, apart from the going to the Commission part, 
change much? 
MR. KRANTZ:  First of all, I think that the statement that the SEC’s 
rules are not dramatically different than 1.13 makes no sense.  
Because if you take a look at the process— 
MS. HACKETT:  Yes, it is a horrible rule. 
MR. KRANTZ:   It is very difficult— 
MS. HACKETT:  Its intentions are good, but it is really a very bad 
rule for purposes of guidance. 
MR. KRANTZ:  It is very difficult to understand.  In large public 
companies the thought that you would be working your way up the 
ladder from president to board; it just would not happen in most 
situations.  As a practical matter, I do not think that the fight that 
goes on is going to focus on how many steps along the way within a 
company you have to go. 
Let me just give you another illustration about how ridiculous 1.13 
is, because most of the companies in America are relatively small 
companies.  I have a situation now where there is a president of the 
company and the sole stockholder.  He asked me to do an internal 
corporate investigation.  I did the investigation and what I 
determined is, he is the problem.   
 First of all, my view is, I guess I have to report that to him.  Then 
the question is, do I then discuss the fact that he has to step aside 
when he is the sole owner of the company or I am going to somehow 
                                                          
 42. See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (approving a proposed 
settlement agreement in a suit involving claims that Caremark’s Board of Directors 
breached their fiduciary duty of care).  Chancellor Allen approved the proposed 
settlement agreement after stating that the claims asserted against the Caremark 
Board at this point were very weak, and that there was a low probability that the 
board breached any duty.  Id. at 961.  The settlement required Caremark to establish 
a “Compliance and Ethics Committee” consisting of four directors, two of whom had 
to be non-management, to meet a minimum of four times a year and report to the 
board annually.  Id. at 966. 
 43. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL  §§ 2B1.1, 2C1.8, 2E5.3, 
2J1.2, 2T4.1, 3D1.2, 5E1.2 (2002 & Supp. 2003) (amending the sentencing guidelines 
under emergency amendment authority granted by Congress and implementing 
provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Campaign Finance Reform Act 
through establishment of penalty levels and individual fines for various white collar 
crimes, violations of permissive election practices, etc.). 
PANEL 3.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:05 PM 
2003] PANEL 3 679 
turn him in? 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  This is the Lord Chancellor and— 
MR. KRANTZ:   There are variations of that where you are dealing 
with very small companies, or family operated companies, in effect, 
where cousins have to decide what to do with somebody who is 
related to them and is also the president.  And 1.13 just—again the 
SEC rules would not deal with that.44 
MS. HACKETT:  The SEC rules would not cover that because it is 
not a public company.45 
MR. KRANTZ:  It is not a public company, right. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  We have a question out here in the 
audience. 
SPEAKER:  I just want to help the Commission here.  We are going 
to be writing comment letters, and I am trying to pinpoint where the 
concerns are about these rules.  There are three areas.  One, the 
mandatory report to the board if senior management won’t do 
anything about that.  What I am hearing is that most of the lawyers 
are going to want to do that anyway, and I have not heard any 
credible argument as to why the board of directors of a client should 
not be told that senior management won’t rectify a violation. 
MS. HACKETT:  They should be told that.  There is no question. 
SPEAKER:  Okay.   That is the first part.  Second part is the 
                                                          
 44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2002) (listing a lawyer’s 
responsibilities when the client is an organization).  Rule 1.13 contemplates a 
situation in which the lawyer represents an organization with a multi-tiered 
management system, rather than a small or family run company.  For example, if a 
lawyer discovers a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, Rule 1.13(b) 
provides measures the lawyer might take, such as: 
(1)asking for reconsideration of the matter; 
(2)advising that a separate opinion on the matter be sought for 
presentation to appropriate authority in the organization; and 
(3)referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, 
including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral 
to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law. 
Id. R. 1.13(b). 
 45. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Website, The Laws that Govern 
the Securities Industry (stating that public companies must register with the SEC under 
the Securities Act of 1933 in order to offer securities to the public, and that 
companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more 
than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic reports under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934), at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Aug. 
8, 2000).  When an attorney represents a public company that must either register or 
report under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley will provide the minimum standards of professional 
conduct for those attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC.  See Frederick 
K. Koenen, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC: New Dilemmas for Attorneys, 17 No. 3 WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME REP. 17, 17 (2002). 
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mandatory noisy withdrawal.46  It seems that is what most lawyers 
would want to do, anyway, to get the heck out of there and disaffirm 
any documents they had given to the Commission that had their 
name on it and that just simply now they know are not true.  Is that a 
concern? 
And/or the third part, which is where the SEC just says the lawyer 
may—does not have to—disclose outside the client organization to 
the Commission, which is what as you correctly point out, forty-one 
states permit.47  I think two, New Jersey and Florida, actually require it 
if there is a client crime—to present information necessary to prevent 
a client crime.48  A very few go along with the ABA rule which is only 
if there is death, grievous bodily injury at stake, and/or the lawyer’s 
fee isn’t paid under Model Rule 1.6.49 
                                                          
 46. See Implementation of the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71706 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
205) (requiring an attorney who has reported evidence of a material violation to the 
issuer, and has not received an appropriate response, to:  withdraw from 
representing the issuer; give written notice to the Commission of the withdraw; and 
promptly disaffirm any document that the attorney has prepared and filed with the 
Commission that may be materially false or misleading). 
 47. See Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality, and the Organizational Client, 
58 BUS. LAW. 123, 128 (stating that forty-one states permit or require disclosure 
outside the client organization to prevent a client from committing a fraud that 
constitutes a crime, while eleven also permit or require disclosure of non-criminal 
fraud if it is “likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property 
of another”). 
 48. See Jolyn M. Pope, Transactional Attorneys—The Forgotten Actors in Rule 1.6 
Disclosure Dramas: Financial Crime and Fraud Mandate Permissive Disclosure of Confidential 
Information, 69 TENN. L. REV. 145, 173 (2001) (discussing various states’ approaches to 
the lawyer’s disclosure of client’s confidential information).  The professional 
responsibility codes in Florida, New Jersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin all provide that 
an attorney must disclose criminal fraud.  Id.  Only Virginia and Wisconsin’s codes 
provide that an attorney must disclose non-criminal fraud.  Id. 
 49. See id. at 158 n.88, 173 (citing the states that track the ABA rule as Alabama, 
Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota).  Additionally, the District of Columbia follows the ABA rule.  Id.; see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (listing situations under which a lawyer may 
disclose client’s confidential information).  Rule 1.6(b) reads: 
(b) a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: 
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a 
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceedings concerning the 
lawyer’s representation of the client. 
The 2002 version of Rule 1.6(b), adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, but not 
currently adopted by any state reads: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of 
a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
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PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  That will also lead to death and bodily 
harm.  
MS. HACKETT:  Handling those two together, the issue that they 
may report outside of the corporation and the issue of the 
disaffirmation of any information reported to the SEC.  I understand 
what you are talking about, but both of those situations involve what I 
would say is a violation of the attorney-client privilege. 
It is impossible for a lawyer to go to the SEC and say to them, “I am 
not divulging anything that is attorney-client privileged or in any way 
violating the trust of my client by telling you that I disaffirm 
everything that has appeared in this company’s 10K for the last five 
years.” 
Are those secret code words that if I say I am withdrawing from 
representation for professional reasons or I am disaffirming 
information filed that we do not all know what that means?  It means 
that the SEC should trigger an investigation.  They should launch an 
investigation. 
SPEAKER:  Okay.  But you have not lost the privilege.  I do not 
think there is a court in the land that— 
MS. HACKETT:  Well, practically, I think you have lost the 
privilege because there is not a single organization out there that is 
not going to say that the lawyer has violated the trust of management 
by reporting that there is illegal activity going on at this company. 
SPEAKER:  The privilege is different.  It is that a court would 
actually say, “Now that all the documents that the lawyer has that are 
communications between the lawyer and the client are now 
discoverable.”50  I do not think that noisy withdrawal sacrifices the 
privilege at all under the rules of evidence.  Correct me, if I am 
wrong. 
                                                          
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(2) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance Rules; 
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a 
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s 
representation of the client; or 
(4) to comply with other law or a court order. 
 50. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:  A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 
§ 1.3.1, at 25-26 (Aspen Law & Business 2002) (explaining that while Rule 1.6 
governs a lawyer’s ethical duty to keep the client’s confidences, this does not govern 
the judicial application of the attorney-client privilege where a judge may issue a 
subpoena against a lawyer to reveal certain client information). 
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PROFESSOR CARLE:  As an ethics professor, I just want to 
introduce the distinction between the evidentiary privilege51 and the 
ethical mandate of confidentiality.52  So we could just switch and talk 
about that, the ethical issue of keeping a client’s information 
confidential. 
SPEAKER:  Yes, see I do not think that you have lost the privilege 
when you do the noisy withdrawal.  The ABA under its own Model 
Rules even allowed, under a comment to 1.6, the noisy withdrawal.53  
It says that it is not an ethical violation.  Even the ABA said that it is 
permissible.  
You do lose the privilege when you go to the SEC and do what they 
say you may do which is to describe what happened.  Now you have 
lost the privilege.  I think the SEC is wrong to say you have not when 
you go.  That is the third part of that which is the optional disclosure.  
MR. KRANTZ:  I can understand the distinction that you are 
making.  But you are still talking about a situation where a lawyer is 
becoming an instrument to be used against a client. 
It is a fundamentally important question.  Maybe you are right.  
Maybe it goes a little bit beyond attorney-client privilege.  But we have 
seen a number of situations of that in other contexts, and I frankly 
am very uncomfortable with the idea of a lawyer becoming an 
instrument that can be used against a client. 
SPEAKER:  But you have not lost the privilege. 
MR. KRANTZ:  I agree that, to frame it this way, you have not lost 
the privilege.  
SPEAKER:  That is the noisy withdrawal.  The third step you have. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  I think there is a question over here. 
SPEAKER: I want go back to something that Professor Bauman said 
earlier, we have all been focusing on legal departments, and lawyers, 
and general counsel.  There is a lot else going on outside that box.  
In a previous life, I did environmental law that was in-house for a 
corporation, and my greatest ally was the risk management 
department and our insurance carrier.  I am curious to know what 
                                                          
 51. See id. at 25-26 (emphasizing that the evidentiary privilege only arises during a 
judicial proceeding when a litigant attempts to compel the disclosure of information 
allegedly protected by this privilege). 
 52. See id. at 25 (describing the ethical privilege as applying to a broader range of 
information than the evidentiary privilege).  Ethical duties prohibit disclosure of a 
client’s information not only in-court, but also out-of-court.  For example, if a lawyer 
discusses a client’s confidential information during a casual conversation, this will 
breach the ethical duty but not the evidentiary duty.  Id. at 26. 
 53. MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (indicating that this rule does 
not prevent a lawyer from giving notice of withdrawal, and does not prohibit 
withdrawing or disaffirming any of the lawyer’s work product). 
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Ms. Hackett’s response is to this, which is, what do your clients or 
members say is happening to their O & D insurance premiums?  I bet 
you they are going up right now.  Has the insurance carrier started to 
look at certain behavior as being more risky today than it was viewed 
as being a year ago?  That’s a major check.  That’s a liability that 
boards and management understand. 
MS. HACKETT:  I think that what we have seen is that certainly 
rates will be going up.  I cannot say that we have done a lot of 
surveying on this or have a lot of very technical information.  What I 
think the greater concern is, however, is that it is going to be harder 
and harder to attract the right people to be directors of 
organizations. 
There already are a dearth of really highly qualified, extremely 
participatory, and well-informed directors who are available out 
there.  Those people who do perform the role of independent 
directors or directors who take part in corporate activity in a 
meaningful way.  There are going to be fewer and fewer of them who 
are willing to work with a larger number of organizations.  They will 
probably limit the number of organizations that they work with so 
they can do that much more diligence, if you will, in working with 
those organizations they stay with. 
I suppose at some level that is good.  I have never been overly fond 
of the model of the director who works with forty-seven different 
corporations because it is virtually impossible for them to really, truly 
be a director at any one of them.  Having said that, a lot of people 
who do not need to do this, because they are either personally 
wealthy or they have come to a point in their careers when they do 
not need to take the hassle of these kinds of requirements that have 
now come out, will simply step away from being directors at all. 
I think that is a shame because very often the best directors are the 
people who have been out in public life for quite a few years, have 
had a broad number of experiences at different organizations, and 
they are simply going to say, “Hey, look, I can’t spend the time 
necessary to certify what I need to certify now for every one of the 
organizations I’d work with, so I’m stepping back.” 
I think that there will be insurer carrier issues.  But I think that 
most people who I am talking to are most concerned about attracting 
the right talent nowadays, because people just won’t want to accept 
the potential for liability that they could have working with 
organizations where they can not be aware of the day-to-day workings 
of these megalithic cultures. 
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PROFESSOR CARLE:  While we are on that topic, there is one 
thing that struck me that I thought lawyers might like, either lawyers 
who counsel other lawyers in malpractice cases, ACCA, or criminal 
defense lawyers, which are the provisions that provide that a lawyer 
who does not want to report outside the organization can use the 
other route of referring the matter to the Qualified Legal 
Compliance Committee (“QLCC”)54, which is supposed to have two 
independent directors on it. 
Isn’t that a solution to all of these problems with 1.13?  You pass 
the buck to somebody else—to somebody who is being paid to 
monitor, paid to direct the organization.  This is an easy bright-line, a 
safe harbor. 
MS. HACKETT:  It is a perfect way to provide cover for lawyers. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Why aren’t you happy about that? 
MS. HACKETT:  That assumes that clients are going to be all that 
interested in establishing one.  Why is it that, practically, if I am the 
CEO of a company and my general counsel comes to me and says, we 
should, as a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, institute this QLCC because it is 
the perfect way to insure that I will have no liability for any problems 
that might arise?  Indeed, we’ll put that liability instead on a couple 
of our directors.  They will be the ones who will report to you, and 
then you will be the ones making the decisions together about 
whether you are going to trigger an SEC discussion. 
MR. KRANTZ:  Then look at their insurance premium. 
MS. HACKETT:  Exactly. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  But they would present the proposition a 
little differently. 
MS. HACKETT:  Of course they would.  But I am just trying to 
create for you what I think is the practical problem with it.  It is a 
brilliant solution to the lawyer liability and the lawyer professional 
responsibility issues.  I think from an earlier conversation someone 
said it was the idea of Harvey Pitt to add this in there.  I think it could 
offer some companies great relief for the legal function. 
But you have got to come back to the client.  Why is the client all 
that interested in establishing yet another audit committee type 
function in an era where they are struggling to understand how to 
                                                          
 54. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. 71670, 71704 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
205.2) (providing that a qualified legal compliance committee must “consist[] of at 
least one member of the issuer’s audit committee and two or more members of the 
issuer’s board of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer 
and who are not, in the case of a registered investment company, ‘interested 
persons’”). 
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deal with and how to properly work with the audit committees they 
are or aren’t working with well already?  I just do not see that there 
are going to be an awful lot of clients who are going to rush to 
embrace this. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Isn’t it possible that it will be like so 
much else in state corporate law, where a court says, “You know, you 
should have an independent negotiating committee.” 
MS. HACKETT:  Absolutely. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  A special litigation committee, and all of 
sudden, there it is?  The court has said it—it sets up an umbrella.  
Although nobody says that there will be no liability if you do that, 
everybody understands it as such.  That is the impetus, because the 
SEC as an agency is giving its blessing to it and that is why you do it. 
MS. HACKETT:  Presumably it is too late to set one up after you 
have already started “up the ladder,” and decided you do not want to 
be responsible for what happens when you get to the top rung. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Sure. 
MS. HACKETT:  By definition, if a court is doing it, it means that 
someone has already fallen afoul of this. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  The SEC has now set out the road map. 
MS. HACKETT:  Okay. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Just as the first case affirmed the validity 
of the special litigation committee—it was too late to set up the 
committee once you’d been sued, except in some cases but generally 
speaking.  Thereon you knew you’d set up that kind of a committee.  
The SEC is now saying, set up a QLCC. 
MS. HACKETT:  I think that the SEC is not saying set up a QLCC, 
though.  I think the SEC is saying, if you wish to avoid attorney-client 
privilege problems, you can go this other route.  At least I do not read 
the rules or what is coming out here as saying—it is saying this is an 
option.  They are not saying this is the best practice. 
It may be that, in a couple of years, it will clearly be the best 
practice.  For the shorter term at least, even though it is a very bright 
solution to the problem for lawyers, it is a lawyer created solution for 
a lawyer problem as opposed to a corporate issue that companies 
seem to think they should be addressing. 
 I am a little bit worried that, although I think it may be very bright, 
I do not think a lot of people are going to rush to adopt them yet.  
They may over time. 
MR. BURGER:  If I was a corporate officer and the president of a 
company asked me, “Art, how would you like to be a member of the 
QLCC—in fact, we’ll let you chair it.”  I think I would say, “I will 
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volunteer for any other committee and I will blow up every balloon 
for the annual New Year’s Party, but I think I have brain surgery 
scheduled for that day that you’re setting up the . . . .” 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  Art, your choice is you choose between 
the audit committee or the QLCC.  You can be the chair of one.  
What’s your pleasure? 
MR. BURGER:  I quit. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  We have a question from the audience. 
SPEAKER:  There was a suggestion earlier that perhaps the QLCC 
in essence would be the audit committee in many instances.  It fits 
within the statutory definition, for instance.  It is already something 
that exists.  What is your sense of how that may play out? 
MS. HACKETT:  I have to spend more time getting cozy with the 
pages that were issued last night, but my understanding is that the 
QLCC that is in this regulation is defined as a three-member 
organization.  While you could say that you were going to create an 
audit committee that had three members who happened to be the 
same three members of the QLCC, I just do not think a lot of 
companies are going to rush to make their audit committee fit this 
role. 
The audit committee right now is by everybody’s standards, in the 
media as well as within the corporate world, the focal point of all 
activity right now.  You want to get the audit committee right.  So, the 
idea of creating a three-person group because that is what is 
mandated here, so it could also serve a double duty as being QLCC, 
just does not seem terribly likely to me. 
But I really have not reviewed this in depth enough to know 
whether it could be composed differently.  I do not know enough 
about audit committee or corporate governance issues to tell you 
whether there are any problems with a three-person audit committee.  
I would presume that, if I was having an audit committee within a 
board, I would probably want the audit committee a little bit larger.  
Not a lot larger but a little bit larger than three members.  I think 
that is a pretty small group. 
I have a feeling the QLCC will be a topic of much discussion in the 
comments that go into the SEC over the course of the next thirty 
days.  It is a new concept out there. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  It ought to be scary to pick up on what 
Judge Sporkin said at lunch to those of you who are students here.  It 
ought to be scary to you how many of us already have the ninety-three 
pages that came out on the Web last night.  Scariest of all is that Art 
has underlined it; he’s got yellow markings all over the place.  That 
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ought to be a really scary object lesson. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  I have a lot of other questions I would love 
to ask the panel, but I am wondering if there are any from the 
students? I think the comments are well taken.  This is something 
that is going to affect your practice lives. 
I am interested in the distinction that is drawn between in-house 
counsel and outside counsel and the idea that in-house counsel’s 
outside reporting obligations are less strict.  My understanding of the 
U.S. system of professional regulation is that the decision was made 
not to draw these distinctions, to recognize the same standards of 
professional responsibility and not create sort of a second class 
category of lawyers who do not really have professional 
independence.  So I would imagine that there is some ambivalence 
about that.  I am just wondering, what’s your position on it? 
MS. HACKETT: As an organization we were founded on the 
principle that there were too many places within the profession, both 
codified and uncodified, where there was disparate treatment 
between the inside bar and outside bar.  So, clearly it is something 
that I am paying very close attention to. 
I think there are an awful lot of people within the in-house 
community who would like to have some kind of buffer written that 
will provide them some level of job security.  I am not speaking on 
their behalf when I tell you that the position of the ACCA has always 
been that in-house counsel do not have any different professional 
obligations and that one of the responsibilities of going in-house—
there are a lot of attendant perks to being an in-house counsel.  
There are different kinds of work environments and different kinds 
of challenges, and different types of career enhancements that are 
available to you. 
One of the difficulties is that if you fall out with your client, it is not 
just one client off the roster of the firm.  Your livelihood has now 
ended, and potentially it can be a career ending issue, not just a 
question of going out and getting another one.  You may be damaged 
goods now in the in-house market. 
We firmly believe as an organization that there are certainly 
legitimate concerns for people who are employed by their clients 
about job security and what their rights as employees may be in 
contradiction to their responsibilities as attorneys.  You are right not 
to be able to exercise whistle-blower kinds of provisions without 
having some kind of repercussion. 
Ultimately, at the end of the day the Association’s stance has always 
been that the client has the ultimate right to choose the counsel of 
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their choice.  If the client does not wish to retain you as counsel, it 
does not matter whether you get your paycheck on a retainer or 
whether you get your paycheck on a corporate stub, you’re out.  You 
should have no ability to force that client to continue to work with 
you. 
 I think that, while the rules may have offered a different track, the 
practical implication outside of the reporting is that both lawyers are 
going to end up without work from that client in the future.  It is 
inconceivable to me that a lawyer who chooses to report to the SEC is 
going to be a welcome colleague on the team in the future, even if 
that person had an obligation to do so.  That is unfortunate, but 
that’s just reality.  Even if they are not fired outright, they will 
probably be constructively unemployed by that corporation pretty 
soon.  
MR. BURGER:  I think that is just a practical reality and was one of 
my concerns about the statute as it was written.  But I think that in 
the rules giving the lawyer the right to report the fact that they think 
that they were fired for complying with this law55—and here is one 
express reference to attorney-client privilege.  It says it is not a 
violation of attorney-client privilege for this discharged lawyer to 
report that fact to the Commission.56  It gives the lawyer an awful lot 
of power in that relationship although that’s a heck of a way to hold 
on to a client. 
MS. HACKETT:  I do not know anyone who would want to 
continue to work in that environment.  Your resume is on the street 
as soon as this happens no matter whether you are inside or you are 
outside on this. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Do you have a question over there? 
SPEAKER: Is Sarbanes-Oxley really a regulatory vehicle for 
correcting what is a lack of concern for the public interest in our 
existing professional responsibility principles? 
MR. BURGER:  Yes. 
MS. HACKETT:  Yes. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  A strong letter follows. 
MR. BURGER:  Let me just say that I think that it is possible to 
overstate the differences that are being made.  As everybody here 
                                                          
 55. See id. at 71706 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)) (stating that an 
attorney who “has reported evidence of a material violation under this section and 
reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged for so doing may notify the 
Commission that he or she believes that he or she has been discharged for reporting 
evidence of a material violation under this section.”). 
 56. See id. (indicating that “[t]he notification to the Commission prescribed by 
this paragraph (d) does not breach the attorney-cleint privilege.”). 
PANEL 3.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:05 PM 
2003] PANEL 3 689 
knows, as long as there has been an attorney-client privilege, there 
has been an exception for crime fraud.57  Plus, this does not go much 
further than Rule 1.13, which I think is a good rule. 
In terms of the federalization of the rules, it will be interesting to 
see if that goes any further.  Now, these rules are limited to just what 
they say and they go out of their way to say that state bar rules still 
apply on everything else that might govern an SEC practice, 
including advertising and the whole panoply.58 
But I think, under the Supremacy Clause,59 it is pretty clear that if 
there were to be an inconsistency between what the rules of 
professional conduct of a particular state require and what a federal 
regulation would require, I think the federal rule would govern.60 
SPEAKER:  If you are dealing with different jurisdictions, aren’t 
you obligated to follow the stricter jurisdiction? I mean, like 
advertising.  West Virginia has various regulations on advertising. 
MR. BURGER:  Advertising is one area in which you clearly are 
going to—the phrase is “jumping the higher hurdle.”  When you 
advertise, in effect you are engaging in conduct wherever the 
advertisement can be read,61 so the choice of law is that you better 
run scared and comply.  But, no, I think the choice of law answer for 
an SEC lawyer, wherever they are licensed is that their conduct would 
                                                          
 57. See David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client 
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 445 (1986) (tracing 
the history of the crime-fraud exception, and indicating that it is traceable to at least 
1743). 
 58. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 71673 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (commenting that the SEC 
does not “intend to supplant state ethics laws unnecessarily, particularly in areas (e.g. 
safeguarding of client assets, escrow procedures, advertising) where the Commission 
lacks expertise.”). 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 60. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 71703 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 205.1) (stating “[w]here the 
standards of a state where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, 
this part shall govern.”).  See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 59, 151-60 (2002) (analyzing whether the Supremacy Clause would give 
Congress the power to establish a uniform system of attorney-client privilege). 
 61. See GREGORY H. SISKIND ET AL., THE LAWYER’S GUIDE TO MARKETING ON THE 
INTERNET 161 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing internet advertising, indicating that it is 
important for lawyers to understand all state rules that will supply to their website 
advertisements as there is no current consensus on jurisdiction); see also LOUISE H. 
HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 137 (1993) (highlighting the issue of potential 
unauthorized practice of law when a lawyer advertises nationally or advertisements 
reach into jurisdictions other than the one in which a lawyer practices, and 
indicating that there is currently no consensus on jurisdictional issues). 
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have to be in compliance with SEC regulations.62 If there were an 
irreconcilable conflict, then I think I would have to go with the SEC 
rules. 
SPEAKER:  But my point is, let’s take the rule for D.C.  I am  
advertising in D.C.  I can get sanctioned by West Virginia, but then 
the D.C. Bar comes after me for reciprocity there— 
MR. BURGER:  Right.  For advertising, you are right.  For anything 
else, I think you are not right, because there is no way in other 
contexts to say necessarily which is more strict.  If D.C. says that you 
can not violate a client confidence, and the SEC says, “oh, yes, you 
can,” then they are different.  I do not know how you would say which 
one is more strict, but I think you would need to comply with the 
federal.  Do you agree, Susan? 
PROFESSSOR CARLE:  Yes. 
MR. BURGER:  Yes. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  We just have a couple of minutes left.  Is 
there anybody who has not had a chance to ask a question who wants 
to comment or ask a question? 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  I wanted to respond to the questioner 
over there. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  Okay. 
PROFESSOR BAUMAN:  To refer you to a very interesting article 
that Richard Painter wrote on the moral interdependence of 
corporate lawyers, that essentially Sarbanes-Oxley is only one part of a 
much more complex—the practice of corporate and securities law is 
a complex business.63 
Sarbanes-Oxley, in the sense that it comes out of Enron, focuses on 
a very, very, very narrow slice.  The broader issues of the role of the 
lawyer, gatekeeper, whatever it is, raise quite seriously issues where 
there are legitimate differences of opinion as to what the appropriate 
role of the lawyer is in the corporate setting. 
SPEAKER (PROFESSOR PAINTER):  The purpose of the optional 
disclosure to the SEC I think is precisely this.  That there are a 
minority of jurisdictions, say about eight or nine, that have adhered 
to the view that the lawyer may not disclosure the client confidences, 
even to prevent a financial fraud.64  The ABA’s own Ethics 2000 
                                                          
 62. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 
Fed. Reg. at 71670 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).   
 63. See Richard W. Painter, Congress Tells Corporate Lawyers to Tell Directors About 
Fraud, 6 No. 3 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM 6 (2002) (emphasizing that it is the duty of 
the SEC to tell corporate lawyers what their responsibilities entail when they discover 
their corporate clients commit fraud). 
 64. See Pope, supra note 48, at 158 n.88, 173 (indicating that Alabama, California, 
PANEL 3.PRINTER.DOC 5/14/2003  3:05 PM 
2003] PANEL 3 691 
Commission recommended that that be changed in 1.6.65 
Over forty jurisdictions say, in effect, what the SEC is saying.66  If 
you are a securities lawyer representing a publicly traded company, 
then you ought to play by the rule that over forty states have adopted, 
which is that you may disclose.  You do not have to, but you may, and 
California shouldn’t be able to hassle you for this or D.C. 
I think you are exactly right, that this is a trumping of those few 
jurisdictions. 
MS. HACKETT:  Let’s just remember that—we were talking about 
this earlier, one on one.  Permissive disclosure has its warts as well.  In 
making a decision as the lawyer as to whether or not you wish to 
report you are going to run into some difficulties as well if you do not 
report and hindsight is always twenty-twenty.  If it looks like you 
should have, you will now be, I believe, held to a higher standard of 
persecution than you would have otherwise. 
I think the other thing that is key to remember here is that if you 
choose to report and you did not have to, how is it that your 
relationship with your client can ever be reconciled?  You have now 
chosen to report them when you didn’t have to report them.  So, you 
have violated the fundamental trust between them whether you like 
that result or not, and that is a practical reality for the people who 
you’re representing. 
I am not an advocate of mandatory disclosure by any stretch of the 
imagination.  But I think we have to be careful about jumping onto 
the boat of saying, “Oh, well, permissive disclosure is the answer as 
                                                          
Delaware, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and 
the District of Columbia do not permit a lawyer to disclose client confidences to 
prevent financial fraud). 
 65. The Ethics 2000 Commission’s Report recommended amending Rule 1.6 to 
include the following subsections to (b) of the confidentiality rule: 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the 
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;  
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to 
result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s 
services;  
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these 
Rules;  
(6)  to comply with other law or a court order.  
American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-report_home.html.  The ABA House of 
Delegates rejected (b)(2), and the Ethics 2000 Commission withdrew (b)(3) 
form consideration.  The delegates accepted (b)(4) and (b)(6).  Id.  
 66. See sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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the result,” because I think it does have warts as well. 
MR. BURGER:  I think there is an argument to be made that if you 
are going to have disclosure, make it mandatory, so the lawyer knows, 
I am supposed to do this, or I am supposed to do that.  At least you 
would have clarity. 
PROFESSOR CARLE:  I see our time is up.  If we could just thank 
our panelists, and then I think the Editor-in-Chief has something to 
say. 
MS. CHLOPAK:  If you could just give me about one more minute 
of your time. I would like once again to thank all of the people who 
have helped make today possible.  In particular, I’d like to thank all 
of the panelists, Dean Pike, Professors Guttman, Wallace, Quinn, and 
Carle, and the editors and staff of the Law Review, especially Julie 
Wilson and Lisa Wetzel Ross, whose extraordinary efforts helped 
make this event a success. 
 
